The MOU Is Paying Off Early for Iran¶
Foreign Policy | July 2, 2026
Summary¶
Two weeks after signing the US-Iran memorandum of understanding, Iran had already exported approximately 40 million barrels of oil — generating significant revenue — while the US had provided written commitments to release billions in frozen assets. The Strait of Hormuz was moving ~40 ships/day (up from zero during the war) but remained far below pre-war levels of 100–140/day. The Doha talks were bogged down, with Iran insisting the US meet all written MOU conditions before nuclear negotiations could advance.
Key Data¶
Iranian Oil Exports Post-MOU¶
- Iranian parliamentary speaker Ghalibaf: 40 million barrels exported since MOU signing (June 17)
- Implied rate: ~3M b/d — higher than pre-war Iranian exports
- Some oil from "floating storage" (oil stored on stationary tankers during the war)
- ~58M barrels currently at sea (UANI estimate as of July 7)
- Revenue estimate: $4–5 billion (at $70–80/bbl)
The General License Problem¶
- General License X expires in late August 2026
- Most countries, banks, and refiners "leery of dealing with sanctioned entities until they have real clarity"
- Most Iranian oil going to usual buyers (China)
- Uncertainty about post-August authorization is limiting Iran's market
Doha Talks Status (as of July 2)¶
- Talks indirect, via Qatar
- Iran insists: US must meet all written MOU conditions before nuclear talks can begin
- US position: want to start "chewing on the bone" of nuclear program
- Iran position: implementation of MOU comes first
Assessment: The MOU Was Imbalanced¶
"The text is drafted in such a way that I have been calling it a 'memo of misunderstanding.'"
— Miad Maleki, sanctions expert, Foundation for Defense of Democracies"This is Iran's way. On certain things, like sanctions relief, they know what they want, while their phased commitments are very vague."
— Miad Maleki
Key imbalance:
- US gave: Sanctions relief, frozen asset release, written commitments on Hormuz management
- Iran gave: Vague commitment to "control" Hormuz — but the agreement specified management would be under IRGC Navy
This structural flaw — US giving leverage away before getting denuclearization commitments — would become critical as the ceasefire frayed in early July.
Hormuz Traffic Data¶
- ~40 ships/day entering/exiting Gulf — up from near-zero during war
- But far below pre-war ~125/day
- More ships transiting with transponders on (defying Iranian threats, remaining visible)
- Benchmark oil prices: ~$70/bbl (falling, down from ~$126 peak)
Related¶
The MOU's problems would become fully apparent by July 6–8, when Iran resumed attacks on ships and Trump declared the deal "over."