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PRICE-ELASTICITY.md — Oil Supply & Demand Price Responsiveness
PRICE-ELASTICITY.md

PRICE-ELASTICITY.md — Oil Supply & Demand Price Responsiveness

Compiled for: oil-shock-monitor-kb | Gap 7

Sources: Federal Reserve (Quant. Economics 2023, Dallas Fed WP 2403 2024), Nature Scientific Reports (2025), web search

Status: Summary

1. Short-Run vs. Long-Run Elasticity Numbers (Cited)

Supply Elasticity

Short-run (≤ 1 year): Effectively zero.

SourceEstimateNotes
Kilian & Murphy (2014)α ∈ (0, 0.025)Very tight upper bound; industry consensus
Braun (2023, Fed Reserve Quant. Econ.)αqp ≈ 0 (posterior near zero)Non-Gaussian SVAR identification; "short-run price elasticity of supply is indeed zero"
ScienceDirect (2023 replication)Confirmed: short-run elasticity = 0Energy Economics journal replication

Long-run (multi-year): Low but non-zero.

SourceEstimateNotes
Kilian (2008/2009)~0.05–0.1Allowing for investment response
Newell & Prest (2019)~0.1–0.2U.S. shale supply elasticity
Caldara, Cavallo & Iacoviello (2019)Up to 0.2–0.3With weaker prior assumptions

Key insight: The disagreement in the literature between "supply barely matters" (Kilian school: <10% of price variance from supply) vs. "supply matters a lot" (Baumeister & Hamilton: up to 37%) stems almost entirely from prior assumptions about the short-run supply elasticity. Under weakly informative priors, supply elasticity could be as high as 0.1; under tight bounds (0.025), it approaches zero.

Capital-Oil Substitution Elasticity (from DSGE model)

From the Dallas Fed DSGE model (Kilian, Plante & Richter, 2024, WP 2403):

**σ = 0.13** (elasticity of substitution between capital and oil)

This is a critically low value — oil and capital are near-complements in production. This means:

3. Demand Destruction Price Threshold

Current market signals (March-April 2026)

SourceThreshold / Signal
Bloomberg (March 2026)Brent surpassing **$100/bl** entering "demand destruction mode"
US Energy Secretary (CERAWeek, March 2026)Prices have "not yet climbed enough to cause demand destruction" at ~$100/bbl
RS Economy (April 2026)Demand destruction peaks **October-November 2026** in prolonged 3+ quarter scenario
Petroleum Economist (April 2026)**$100/bl** described as "psychological and structural threshold"

Academic thresholds

Nature Scientific Reports finding (2025)

Supply chain model found that demand-side disruptions caused the most increase in overall supply chain cost (more than supply disruptions), because rising demand led to more volume procurement, storage, and transport. This underscores the two-way relationship: high prices cause demand destruction, which eventually rebalances the market.

5. Key Takeaways for Price Scenario Modeling

QuestionAnswerConfidence
Can supply respond in weeks?No. Elasticity ≈ 0Very High
Can demand respond in weeks?No. Elasticity ≈ −0.1High
Is $80/bbl achievable with 3–5 MMbpd disruption?Only if disruption resolves quickly (<1 month) or demand destruction offsetsMedium
Is $180/bbl achievable?Yes, if disruption is prolonged AND market prices in persistent risk premiumMedium-High
Does demand destruction cap prices?Yes, but with 1–3 quarter lagMedium
Is OPEC spare capacity a buffer?Thin: ~1.5–3 MMbpd effective (vs. 5+ MMbpd headline)High
Is capital-oil substitution a stabilizer?Almost none (σ = 0.13)Very High