Source: TankerTrackers.com, Inc. (X / Twitter)
Post URL: https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2102728349932019787
Date/Time: September 23, 2026, 11:54 UTC (= 13:54 Europe/Paris)
Author: TankerTrackers.com, Inc. (@TankerTrackers)
Methodology reference: https://x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2093007480448016758/photo/1 (Aug 27 2026, 16:07 UTC; 194.3K views)
Type: Single-post social media (Tier 3 — commercial maritime intelligence, proprietary satellite/AIS/dark-fleet data)
Capture: 2026-09-23, direct web_fetch HTTP 200 (main post + infographic both fetched successfully)

Full Post Text (Verbatim, Captured Directly)

The numbers have doubled in less than a month.

The total crude oil egress via the USN-BL is now 13 Mbpd, with estimated SoH transits at 10.35 Mbpd given that Fujairah and Mina al-Fahal together account for around 2.65 Mbpd on average.

This is partly attributed to Saudi Arabia having to swing back its exports eastwards due to pipeline disruption, but also due to daytime transits via the SoH under additional CENTCOM protection.

Note: Post is standalone (no quoted/parent thread visible in the fetched extract). It is a single tweet, not a multi-tweet thread. The "doubled in less than a month" phrase implicitly compares the current 13 Mbpd to a measurement from approximately mid-August 2026 — TankerTrackers' Aug 27 infographic (post 2093007480448016758) likely captures the earlier measurement, which by arithmetic would have been ~6.5 Mbpd (13 ÷ 2 = 6.5).

Referenced Methodology (Aug 27 2026 Infographic Post, Verbatim)

Here's an infographic we shared with clients a couple of days ago for folks to understand. The maths are quite simple.

Our method is to count the daily average of what departs the US Navy blockade line. We then substract [sic] from that what we know comes out of Oman and Fujairah. The rest is traffic deriving via the Strait of Hormuz.

Equation: USN - Oman - Fuj = SoH.

— TankerTrackers.com, Inc. (@TankerTrackers)
4:07 PM · Aug 27, 2026
[194.3K Views]

Author Identification & Provenance

Field Value Source
Name TankerTrackers.com, Inc. tankertrackers.com (commercial maritime intelligence firm)
Handle @TankerTrackers X URL slug
Established Commercial provider of satellite imagery, shoreside photography, and AIS data tankertrackers.com
Coverage Oil exports from 25+ countries (Angola, Congo, DRC, Ecuador, Eq Guinea, Gabon, Guyana, Iran, Iraq N/S, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, USA, Venezuela, Yemen) tankertrackers.com (existing KB ingestion)
KB standing Tier 3 — proprietary commercial platform with partial public visibility Prior KB entry: tankertrackers-dark-fleet-tracking-jun10-2026
Methodology innovation Tracks vessels operating with AIS disabled (dark-fleet); reconstructs their movements via satellite imagery tankertrackers.com

Standing: Tier 3 (proprietary commercial data platform with established track record). TankerTrackers has been a recurring source in the KB since the Jun 10 dark-fleet tracking ingestion. Their data is observational, not modeled, and is independent of IEA / EIA / OPEC+ / Saudi / Iranian official figures.

Decoding the Numbers

What the 13 Mbpd / 10.35 Mbpd / 2.65 Mbpd refer to

Term Definition (per TankerTrackers methodology) Value (Sep 23 2026)
USN-BL Daily average crude cargo physically departing the US Navy blockade line — measured via satellite AIS + dark-fleet reconstruction. This is the complete observation of Gulf crude egress eastwards. 13 Mbpd
Fujairah UAE crude reaching the Gulf of Oman port via the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline (~1.5 mb/d bypass capacity). Outside the SoH chokepoint — cargo shipped from Fujairah is not a SoH transit. ~1.5 mb/d (within the 2.65 mb/d total)
Mina al-Fahal Oman's main oil terminal on the Gulf of Oman / Arabian Sea coast, served by Omani internal pipeline. Outside the SoH chokepoint — Omani crude reaches Mina al-Fahal via internal pipeline. ~1.15 mb/d (within the 2.65 mb/d total, by subtraction)
SoH transits Crude tanker transits physically through the Strait of Hormuz (= USN-BL minus Fujairah minus Mina al-Fahal). 10.35 Mbpd (= 13 - 2.65)

What the "doubled in less than a month" framing implies

If USN-BL total doubled from a baseline of ~6.5 Mbpd to 13 Mbpd in <30 days:
- The baseline observation is consistent with the late-Aug / mid-Sep 2026 phase when EW Pipeline was operating at the pre-shutdown 4 mb/d (per 2026-09-22-reuters-saudi-ew-pipeline-restart confirming ~4 mb/d pre-shutdown bypass).
- During that phase, the SoH channel was relatively compressed because:
- Saudi was primarily using the EW Pipeline → Yanbu → Red Sea routing
- Hormuz-side Saudi loadings were lower than typical
- CENTCOM daytime SoH protection may not have been at current levels
- The doubling reflects the collapse of EW Pipeline bypass post-Sep 11 + the return of Saudi Ras Tanura loadings (The National Sep 22: 7 VLCCs / 14 mmbbl at Ras Tanura over weekend) + the CENTCOM daytime SoH protection enabling daylight transits.

This is a physical-flow recovery from a particular trough, not necessarily a structural improvement vs. pre-crisis.

Reconciliation with the Existing KB Disruption Estimates (~15-17 mb/d full-flow unavailable / ~11-13 mb/d production-cut)

The two KB numbers

Per the east-west-pipeline concept article (Sep 22 partial-restart update):
- ~15-17 mb/d (full basis) — net barrels that cannot reach normal buyers under the current partial-restart regime
- ~11-13 mb/d (production-cut basis) — net barrels where Saudi Aramco must throttle Eastern Province production to keep storage in balance
- These are DERIVATIVE FRAMINGS, derived from the 2026-09-12-thierry-bros-x-shock-14mbd-disrupted reconciliation (gross Hormuz disruption ~18 mb/d, minus Saudi bypass, minus China demand destruction ≈ 5 mb/d, with EW partial-restart back at unknown low rate)

What TankerTrackers measures vs. what the KB estimates

Dimension TankerTrackers (Sep 23 11:54 UTC) KB estimate (post-partial-restart)
Type of measurement Direct observation of physical tanker cargo at one line Derivative estimate of "barrels unable to reach normal buyers"
Coverage Crude only (not LNG, not products) Crude + adjustments for production cut, demand destruction, routing changes
Reference baseline Implied pre-crisis; some pre-existing bypass pipelines (Habshan-Fujairah, Mina al-Fahal) are baked in Pre-crisis ~20 mb/d Hormuz flow (per Bros / IEA / Dallas Fed)
What it captures Cargo physically past USN-BL Barrels that "should be flowing" minus "actually flowing for some subset of buyers"

The two are not directly additive. A TankerTrackers observation of 13 Mbpd USN-BL and a KB estimate of 15-17 mb/d full-flow unavailable are looking at different frames.

Crude-math reconciliation (no double-counting attempt)

The following arithmetic is offered as one possible reconciliation without double-counting the TankerTrackers observation:

Component mb/d Notes
Pre-crisis SoH crude flow (Feb 2026, IEA / Bros / Dallas Fed) ~20 Reference baseline (includes ~3 mb/d Iran, ~2 mb/d Qatar/misc, ~15 mb/d other GCC + Iraq + Kuwait)
Minus: Iran barrels (sanctioned, shadow-fleet / mostly off the official observation line) -3 Whether Iran's pre-crisis 3 mb/d is comparable to current observation depends on whether TankerTrackers counts Iranian dark-fleet shadow cargo. Prior KB (Jun 10): "12 ships with non-Iranian Middle Eastern barrels doing STS transfers" — implies TankerTrackers distinguishes Iranian from non-Iranian. Assume Iran is NOT in the 13 Mbpd USN-BL count.
Minus: structural demand destruction (China ~5 mb/d lower; EM aggregate ~0.5-1 mb/d lower) -5 to -6 China ~5 mb/d below normal per 2026-09-12-thierry-bros-x-shock-14mbd-disrupted citing Vitol/Baker + IEA
Implied "expected current flow" in a no-disruption scenario ~9-12 = 20 - 3 - 5-6
Observed USN-BL (TankerTrackers) 13 Higher than the "expected current flow" range — suggests current physical flow is at or above the demand-destruction-adjusted baseline. This is consistent with the "doubled in less than a month" recovery framing (i.e., physical flow has recovered to meet the displaced demand profile).

This crude arithmetic would suggest the post-partial-restart physical-flow disruption is smaller than the ~15-17 mb/d "full-flow unavailable" estimate suggests — by roughly 2-4 mb/d. But this should be read with substantial caution:

  1. The 15-17 mb/d includes downstream disruption effects (Bab al-Mandab, Yanbu-stranded cargo, etc.) that are invisible to the USN-BL observation.
  2. The 13 Mbpd USN-BL is one snapshot at one line — it doesn't capture Brent-to-Bab al-Mandab-to-Suez routing, Yanbu storage build/draw, or Port Said STS prep.
  3. EW Pipeline partial-restart flows are going mostly NORTH (Mediterranean via Port Said STS / Sidi Kerir) per 2026-09-22-reuters-saudi-ew-pipeline-restart — these are not counted at USN-BL because USN-BL measures the PERSIAN GULF exit line, not the Red Sea exit.
  4. Bab al-Mandab downstream disruption remains ACTIVE (per bab-al-mandab-compounding-scenario) — Yanbu crude heading south faces Houthi risk; the post-partial-restart first cargo is heading NORTH, not south.

A defensible reconciliation (without double-counting)

Concept Value Type
TT observed (Sep 23 11:54 UTC) 13 Mbpd USN-BL / 10.35 Mbpd SoH transit OBSERVED physical flow at one line
Existing KB disruption estimate (Sep 22+) ~15-17 mb/d full / ~11-13 mb/d production-cut ESTIMATE of "barrels unable to reach normal buyers"
TT observation vs. KB estimate Consistent, NOT additive TT confirms physical flow is rebounding from late-Aug trough; KB estimate captures broader disruption framing that includes downstream/storage/demand effects invisible to USN-BL

The TankerTrackers observation does NOT replace the 15-17 mb/d / 11-13 mb/d figures. It does NOT refute them either. It provides an independent data point on physical tanker movement that is consistent with the broader narrative (Saudi swing-back + CENTCOM daytime SoH transits, per TT's own attribution).

What TankerTrackers data IMPLIES for the Sep 22 partial-restart diagnosis

Element Implication from TankerTrackers observation
Saudi swing-back east CONFIRMED. TT explicitly cites "Saudi Arabia having to swing back its exports eastwards due to pipeline disruption." This is an independent observation corroborating 2026-09-22-reuters-saudi-ew-pipeline-restart's Hormuz-side loadings ramp-up (The National: 7 VLCCs / 14 mmbbl at Ras Tanura over weekend).
EW Pipeline partial-restart is fragile / not full-rate CONFIRMED. If EW were fully operating at 4 mb/d, Saudi would not need to swing this much back to SoH. TankerTrackers' "doubled in less than a month" framing reinforces that EW partial-restart is insufficient to handle Saudi's full export book — forcing a dual-track export strategy (Yanbu partial + Ras Tanura ramp-up).
CENTCOM daytime SoH protection is enabling transits CONFIRMED. TT explicitly cites daytime transits under additional CENTCOM protection. This is a military / security channel that is enabling physical flow; whether it is sustainable depends on operational tempo.
Bab al-Mandab downstream unchanged NOT ADDRESSED in this post. The 13 Mbpd USN-BL observation is on the PERSIAN GULF side of SoH. Red Sea / Bab al-Mandab disruptions are NOT counted here.
Saudi Aramco official confirmation of EW partial-restart rate NOT RELATED. TankerTrackers data is independent of Aramco's public statements.

Critical Caveats

  1. Post is observational, not modeled. TankerTrackers counts physical cargo at a specific line. It does not compute "barrels unable to reach normal buyers" or "production cuts" — those are different concepts requiring different math. No double-counting should be attempted by adding the 13 Mbpd USN-BL to the 15-17 mb/d KB disruption estimate. They are different measurements.

  2. Single-snapshot observation. The 13 Mbpd is a current snapshot (Sep 23 11:54 UTC). It does not necessarily represent the prior month or even the prior week. The "doubled in less than a month" implies a strong upward trend, but TT does not provide daily series data in this public post.

  3. Methodology not fully transparent. "US Navy blockade line" is a counting line specific to TT's observation framework. The exact geographic definition is not detailed in the public post. Readers should not assume USN-BL = Hormuz chokepoint — they are different concepts (USN-BL is INSIDE the Persian Gulf; SoH is the Gulf-Oman exit; Habshan-Fujairah pipeline delivers directly to Gulf of Oman).

  4. Dark-fleet adjustment methodology — TankerTrackers' proprietary methodology includes reconstructing movements of vessels operating with AIS disabled. This is the firm's distinctive value-add but is not independently verifiable by external observers. Other tracking firms (Kpler, Vortexa) have their own methodologies which may yield different numbers.

  5. Iran barrels not counted. If TT excludes Iranian crude (per Jun 10 pattern: "non-Iranian Middle Eastern barrels doing STS transfers"), the 13 Mbpd is essentially a non-Iran Gulf crude count. Pre-crisis Hormuz crude (~20 mb/d including ~3 mb/d Iran) would have had a non-Iran baseline of ~17 mb/d. The TT-implied non-Iran USN-BL decline is therefore ~19 - 13 = ~6 mb/d, not the larger numbers in the KB.

  6. Numbers "doubled in less than a month" is TankerTrackers' framing, not an audited statistic. The phrase is rhetorical; the precise baseline for "less than a month ago" is not specified.

  7. The Sep 23 11:54 UTC timestamp is the X post timestamp (computed from snowflake ID 2102728349932019787 via the formula (id >> 22) + 1288834974657). The observation window for the 13 Mbpd / 10.35 Mbpd / 2.65 Mbpd figures is implied to be recent (days-to-weeks of measurement).

  8. Single post, no thread. Like Bros' Sep 12 post, this is a standalone tweet — no follow-up methodology paper, no dashboard link, no CSV. Treat as informed commentary with proprietary observation, not as a published forecast.

  9. The "Methodology" subsection above is reconstructed from the Aug 27 infographic post. TankerTrackers' Aug 27 infographic is referenced as a prior infographic explaining the methodology; the post itself includes the image, but the text and equation ("USN - Oman - Fuj = SoH") are all that web_fetch captured reliably.

Significance for the KB

  1. Independent Tier 3 observational data point on physical flow. This is the second X-sourced observational source ingested into the KB in this crisis (2026-09-12-thierry-bros-x-shock-14mbd-disrupted was the first). Both are Twitter/X posts from credentialed observers (Bros: Sciences Po professor; TankerTrackers: commercial maritime intelligence platform). Both are standalone posts with limited transparency but useful as triangulation points against institutional narratives.

  2. Confirms "Saudi swung back eastwards due to pipeline disruption" attribution. This corroborates the 2026-09-22-reuters-saudi-ew-pipeline-restart framing (Hormuz-side loadings ramped up; 7 VLCCs / 14 mmbbl at Ras Tanura over weekend per The National). Saudi is dual-tracking exports (Yanbu partial + Ras Tanura ramp-up) because EW Pipeline partial-restart is insufficient.

  3. Confirms CENTCOM daytime SoH protection as a real channel. This is a military / security fact — daytime SoH transits are happening under CENTCOM protection. Implies a US military operational tempo in the Persian Gulf. Sustainability depends on continued deployment.

  4. Numbers-doubled framing implies an inflection point. Going from ~6.5 Mbpd to 13 Mbpd in <30 days means the recovery is dramatic — likely driven by (a) EW Pipeline partial-restart allowing Saudi to better balance, (b) CENTCOM daytime transits, (c) possibly Hormuz mine-clearing progress (KB has no specific mine-clearing update on this post).

  5. Does NOT change the ~15-17 mb/d / ~11-13 mb/d disruption estimates. Those represent "barrels unable to reach normal buyers" — a different framing. Adding TT's 13 Mbpd to those numbers would be double-counting. The TT observation is a separate sanity check that physical flow is rebounding from the late-Aug trough.

  6. Doesn't directly address Bab al-Mandab downstream. The 13 Mbpd is on the Persian Gulf side. Red Sea / Bab al-Mandab disruptions remain ACTIVE per bab-al-mandab-compounding-scenario. TankerTrackers data does not refute or support that conclusion.

  7. Implication for scenario-B-tracker regime indicators. The scenario-b-tracker-2026-09-16 tracking framework categorizes the three ME chokepoints as Hormuz / EW Pipeline / Bab al-Mandab. TankerTrackers' 13 Mbpd USN-BL / 10.35 Mbpd SoH can now be logged as a physical-flow data point under the Hormuz regime indicator (raw observed flow, not a regime classification), adding transparency to the existing regime tracking without altering the regime classification itself.

Ingested 2026-09-23 from x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2102728349932019787. Direct fetch HTTP 200, full text captured verbatim. Author identity verified via tankertrackers.com (existing Tier 3 source in KB). Methodology infographic (Aug 27 2026) referenced from x.com/TankerTrackers/status/2093007480448016758/photo/1 (HTTP 200). Post timestamp computed from X snowflake ID: 2026-09-23T11:54:40Z UTC / 13:54:40 Europe/Paris. The 13 Mbpd / 10.35 Mbpd / 2.65 Mbpd numbers are observed physical tanker movement at a specific line, NOT a disruption estimate. No double-counting attempted against the ~15-17 mb/d full-flow unavailable / ~11-13 mb/d production-cut figures from the East-West Pipeline concept update — those are different framings. Q-pages intentionally not edited (task acceptance criteria). Light touch edits applied to east-west-pipeline (Saudi swing-back confirmation) and scenario-b-tracker-2026-09-16 (regime indicator data point).