EU Commission: Security of Gas Supply

Institution: European Commission (DG Energy)

Date: Ongoing — framework policy page (updated 2025)

URL: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-security/security-gas-supply_en

File: eu-commission-security-of-gas-supply.md

Summary

This EU Commission policy page describes the EU's Security of Gas Supply framework, particularly the response to the end of Russian gas transit via Ukraine on December 31, 2024. It documents how the EU successfully managed the transition away from Russian pipeline gas through diversification, LNG infrastructure expansion, and mandatory storage regulations. The 90% gas storage filling target (established post-2022 and prolonged to 2027) is a central pillar of the EU's security of supply architecture. The Gas Coordination Group monitors supply adequacy year-round.

Key Findings

1. **End of Russian gas transit via Ukraine:** The Ukraine-Russia gas transit agreement expired on **December 31, 2024**. The 14 bcm/year still transiting via Ukraine was assessed as fully replaceable by LNG and non-Russian pipeline imports via alternative routes. No security of supply concerns were identified at the January 2, 2025 Gas Coordination Group meeting. (EU Commission, Security of Gas Supply)

1. **Gas storage regulation (90% target):** The EU established a mandatory **90% storage filling target** (until December 31, 2025) under Regulation (EU) 2022/2294, adopted in June 2022 following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The regulation was prolonged for 2 years by the **Amending Regulation on Gas Storage (EU/2025/1733)**, adopted and published **September 10, 2025**. (EU Commission)

1. **Gas storage as supply shock absorber:** The Commission's 2022 proposal highlighted that gas storage contributes to security of supply by "absorbing supply shocks in case of strong demand or supply disruptions." (EU Commission)

1. **Preventive and emergency plans:** The Gas Security of Supply Regulation requires EU countries to maintain:

• **Preventive action plans:** measures to remove or mitigate identified gas supply risks
• **Emergency plans:** measures to remove or mitigate impact of a gas supply disruption

Both must be updated every 4 years and include regional chapters. (EU Commission)

1. **Gas Coordination Group (GCG):** A standing advisory group coordinating security of supply measures, especially during crises. Members include national authorities, ACER, ENTSOG, the Energy Community, and industry/consumer representatives. The GCG continuously monitors storage levels and security of supply throughout the EU. (EU Commission)

1. **Diversification as core strategy:** The EU's resilience has been built through gas storage filling targets, increased LNG capacities, energy efficiency measures, and renewable energy deployment — collectively the REPowerEU framework's core objectives. (EU Commission)

1. **Voluntary demand reduction measures:** A pillar of EU crisis response alongside supply diversification and storage. (EU Commission)

Entities Mentioned

• **Organizations:** European Commission (DG Energy), Gas Coordination Group (GCG), Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), ENTSOG, Energy Community, European Parliament, Council of the EU
• **Places/Countries:** EU Member States (27), Ukraine, Russia
• **Infrastructure:** Underground gas storage (UGS) facilities, LNG terminals, European gas pipeline network
• **Numbers:** 14 bcm/year (former Russian transit volume via Ukraine), 90% (storage filling target), September 10, 2025 (amending regulation adoption), December 31, 2024 (end of Russian transit), December 31, 2025 (original storage target end date)

Relevance to Q1/Q2/Q3

• **Q1 (Hormuz closure extent):** Not directly relevant — this is a policy framework document describing the EU's pre-existing security architecture. Most useful as background for understanding the institutional framework within which the EU responded to the Hormuz crisis.
• **Q2 (Price impact):** Low direct relevance — not a price forecasting document. The 90% storage target and infrastructure resilience documented here are structural factors that would affect the magnitude and duration of price impacts.
• **Q3 (Europe gas/security):** High direct relevance — core institutional source for EU gas security framework. Documents EU's preparedness (storage regulations, coordination mechanisms, diversification) and serves as the framework against which the post-Hormuz crisis response can be measured.

Related Articles

Q1-SUPPLY-DESTRUCTION Q2-PRICE-IMPACT Q3-EUROPE-IMPACT

Cross-references: EU-Commission-Gas-Security ↔ GIE-Security-Supply-2025 ↔ ENTSOG ↔ EC-EU-Prepared ↔ Bruegel ↔ IndexBox