Open Questions

Last updated: 2026-05-25

These are the questions the KB cannot yet answer with confidence — either because the data doesn't exist, because the events haven't unfolded, or because institutional sources haven't addressed them directly.

Supply & Production¶

What is the actual Iranian production and export capacity post-deal?¶

The May 23 framework deal would permit Iranian oil sales "freely" — but Iran's pre-sanctions production capacity, current operational status of fields, and time-to-ramp curves are not well-documented in public sources. How quickly can Iran actually restore exports? Months? Weeks? The physical infrastructure may have degraded during the sanctions period.

Status: Unknown — requires Iranian energy ministry data or industry intelligence

Is the UAE departure from OPEC a one-time structural shift or the beginning of an OPEC+ unraveling?¶

The UAE departed effective May 1. This removes a meaningful chunk of effective spare capacity from OPEC+ calculations. But whether this is a structural realignment or a negotiating tactic within the broader OPEC+ framework is unclear.

Status: Unknown — geopolitical, not yet resolved

What is the actual US production response timeline?¶

The KB has confirmed: no supply response visible in near-term data (as of April 2026). But the longer-term question — when does Permian/DJ Basin shale respond, and at what WTI price point — remains inadequately documented. Goldman and JPMorgan have models but they were wrong-footed on this crisis.

Status: Partially documented — production response lags and price thresholds need better sourcing

What happens to Russian production under the current disruption?¶

Russia is a wild card throughout this period. Sanctions enforcement on Russian exports, Russian production levels, and whether Russia sees opportunity in disrupted Hormuz flows — none of this is well-covered in the current KB.

Status: Data gap — see CRS Iran-Hormuz for partial coverage

Price & Markets¶

When does the physical market reconnect with paper?¶

The $51/bbl physical-futures disconnect at peak was the defining market event of this crisis. The May 23 deal moved paper markets sharply lower while the physical market had not adjusted. The key question: when does the physical market catch down to paper, or does paper catch up to physical?

Status: Live question — watching daily Brent/WTI spreads and backwardation structure

Does demand destruction materialise, and at what price?¶

The KB documents the demand destruction threshold as "$120–$130/bbl" range triggering demand destruction in price-sensitive markets (EM Asia, aviation). But the actual measured demand response to $130+ Brent is not yet in the data.

Status: Hypothesised — not yet empirically confirmed in the KB

What is the real inventory draw rate and when does it hit physical shortage?¶

JPMorgan warned of OECD "operational minimum" by September. But actual April/May 2026 inventory data in the KB is thin. The gap between announced government data releases and the actual draw rate needs filling.

Status: Data-poor — current sources are JPMorgan projections, not confirmed data

Europe¶

Can European LNG substitution meaningfully offset the crude disruption?¶

Europe's LNG import capacity expanded significantly post-2022 Russian pipeline cuts. But LNG substitutes gas, not crude-derived feedstocks (petrochemicals, transport fuels, heating oil). The switchability of European refining infrastructure is not addressed.

Status: Data gap — requires EC/IEA country-specific data

What are actual European storage levels as of April–May 2026?¶

The KB has pre-crisis starting position (October 2025: ~83% full) but no confirmed April–May 2026 levels.

Status: Data gap

What is the urea/fertilizer supply chain impact on European agriculture?¶

Middle Eastern ammonia/urea supply chains feed European agriculture. This second-order effect is not covered in any current KB source.

Status: Data gap — no institutional coverage

Deal Integrity¶

Does the May 23 framework deal hold for 60 days?¶

The central live question. The April 8 ceasefire failed. The KB cannot answer this — it is a forward-looking event, not a data question.

Status: Live event — KB can only document, not predict

What happens to oil markets if the deal collapses mid-execution?¶

If the framework deal fails, the market repricing could be more violent than the initial shock. The physical market has already partly priced resolution; the reversal premium would compound.

Status: Scenario analysis only

What enforcement mechanism exists for the Hormuz reopening?¶

Who monitors and enforces the Hormuz reopening commitment? This question — who guarantees the guarantee — is not covered in any KB source and is critical to evaluating deal durability.

Status: Unknown — requires diplomatic/strategic intelligence coverage

Geopolitical¶

What is China's strategic posture toward the Hormuz disruption?¶

China is the largest oil importer and a major Hormuz user. Beijing's response — diplomatic, strategic reserve release, commercial contracts with Iran post-deal — is largely absent from the KB.

Status: Data gap — Chinese energy policy sources needed

How does India's energy diplomacy respond?¶

India is heavily dependent on Middle Eastern crude. India's hedging strategy — Saudi outreach, US waivers, strategic reserve usage — is not covered.